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1. Introduction    
In the case of product change, it is well known that incremental product innovation is well 
managed by the cooperation between marketing knowledge and technology knowledge 
(von Hippel, 1988, 2005, 2009; Clerk and Fujimoto, 1991). If knowing marketing needs and 
technology seeds is enough to develop the new product, the market leader with research 
capability could hold the best position to become a successor in the field. The reality is 
different from this assumption; the successor is very often replaced (Christensen, 1997).  
There is a lot of discussion on success factors in product innovation: which is the 
determinant for success in product innovation, technology-push or market-pull? According 
to technology-driven theory, the importance of technological innovation is highlighted for 
product innovation (Rosenberg, 1976; Freeman, 1982; OECD, 1984; Dosi. 1982, 1984, 2010a, 
2010b). In contrast, market-driven product innovation has highlighted the importance of 
market needs or customer needs (Rothwell et al., 1974; von Hippel 1979, 1980, 2005, 2009, de 
Jong & von Hippel, 2009). These discussions have not led to any sufficient conclusion. With 
respect to new product development (NPD), the aforementioned opposing theories have 
highlighted the importance of technology knowledge and market knowledge. Although the 
applicability of the theory depends on the respective product, it is absolutely obvious that 
the product is an embodiment of market knowledge and technology knowledge. In the case 
of novel technology emerging, technology seemed to serve as a major driving factor to 
introduce the relevant new product into a market. It is also well recognized that market 
knowledge can stimulate successful NPD. It seems to be obvious that market knowledge 
assists the accumulation of technology knowledge. Apparently, both technology knowledge 
and market knowledge are able to serve as the key factors that enhance successful NPD. If 
so, the market leader can keep its leading position in the market for the next generation of 
new products and hence the market leader cannot be easily taken over by the newcomer, 
even if the new product creates a new market. For continuous NPD, this assumption is true.  
The concurrent engineering system is thought to be the best way to launch the next product 
into the market (Hammer & Champy, 1993). For the automobile industry and the electricity 
industry, many authors have demonstrated the advantage of the collaboration between 
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technology and the market (Ohno, 1988; von Hippel, 1988). The opposite of this finding is 
true. There are many examples of major players losing their strong position in the market 
when new products emerged. Why can’t leading companies maintain the best position in 
the market? It seems to be related to the characteristics of the product. This problem has not 
yet been solved by the current discussions on NPD. In this chapter, a recent change to a 
product in the high tech markets such as bio, nanotech, ICT market are studied.  
This work demonstrates that a strong product inhibits the NPD of a newly emerging 
product that will replace the existing product market in the future, furthermore, that there is 
no need to have the core competence for the existing market or technology. In order to 
demonstrate the behavior of the companies, R&D and market analysis have been carried 
out. Section 2 identifies the characteristics of product and players change in the high tech 
industry. Section 3 analyzes the behavior of the company in the case of product change. 
Section 4 describes the case studies of product change at mature stage of the existing 
markets. Section 5 presents mechanism of success or loss. Section 6 concluded the fate leads 
the success or loss of each of major players in the new born high tech market like invisible 
hand of God. How to evade from the fate is the most important implication at the end of this 
chapter; all businesses, though, cannot evade from the fate of the law of success or failure. 
2. Current situations and structural problems of high tech industry 
management 
The market of the high tech industry is in the process of development: the whole panorama 
remains invisible. Little attention has been paid to idiosyncrasies of the high tech industry in 
terms of technology and market. While it is relatively easy to forecast future development of 
existing industries, this is not the case for the high tech industry. The situation is analogous to 
the difference between physics and biology: logical forecasts useful in existing industries do 
not work for the high tech industry, which is as unpredictable as the world of bio-organisms. 
Successful innovation and commercialization of new products or new business require a 
perpetual cycle of hypothesizing, verification and exploring about the products or businesses 
and their markets. Many enterprises have failed in high tech products or businesses because of 
this cycle conducted in a traditional manner. In other words, such enterprises were "revenged" 
by their success itself (Takayama, 2002, 2005; Takayama & Watanabe, 2002), only wasting their 
money, labor and time. There is a structure that prevents the conventional methods from 
succeeding, and the real problem is that not only major market players but also entrepreneurs 
are not aware of that structure set forth in the new born markets. 
2.1 Absolute win or unavoidable loss in bio-industry businesses 
As a matter of fact, many existing major businesses have failed in seemingly promising 
development projects especially of innovative products or businesses. Their extensive and 
preceding investments for R&D or facilities, including those for establishing new 
laboratories or huge infrastructures, did not prevent newcomers with different backgrounds 
from winning their market shares. The typical feature of the investment is prioritized and 
authorized by top management among the high tech related industries in common. Even 
with knowledge of new technologies, products and markets at higher level than their 
competitors, majors will certainly lose under some conditions, while winning under others. 
As a typical case of the bio-industry market, in the applications of the recombinant DNA 
technique, all related firms had established bio-tech institutes under the prevailing bio-tech era 
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in 1980s. This bio-tech institute boom is not only limited to life science related firms such as 
pharmaceutical, beer, fermentation etc. but also absolutely unrelated firms in such industries 
as chemical, textile, food, steel, electrical industry etc. All businesses have believed still now 
that establishing only institute could strike gold mine from the huge unveiled markets.  
The result of the win or loss was simple. Agricultural majors have continued to win the victory 
by successively launch of recombinant plant. They have kept competitors out of the existing 
market. Only the exception was a new born market segment like blue carnation and blue rose 
market made by outsider Suntory. On the contrary, pharmaceutical majors could not develop 
any bio-pharmaceuticals by own efforts. It should be emphasized that they could not take the 
opportunity by introducing bio-products even at very cheap licensing fee offered by bio-
venture like Genentech, although business routine based on open discussion has been 
established in the organizational structure of every firm for a long time. Major players failed 
the bio-pharmaceutical market. Typical winner was Amgen that is started by spin-off 
researchers from Merck & Co. Inc. in the USA and became Board Chairman of PhRMA 
(Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers in America) and actual revenue including 
licensees is presumed almost equivalent to the sales amount of Merck. If Merck could hold 
scientists in its R&D activity, it could keep the steadfast and immovable position in the current 
market. Exception was catch-up type bio-products like insulin, human growth hormone. All of 
such catch-up type recombinant-products are marketed by strong players in the existing 
pharmaceutical market even if the first discovery was made by bio-venture like Genentech. 
In conclusion, the fate of win or loss were opposite, as shown in Table 1: agricultural majors 
were successful in excluding newcomers from the recombinant plants market, while no 
pharmaceutical majors were able to commercialize recombinant drugs in spite of large-scale 
R&D programs in dedicated laboratories. 
 
 Existing businesses’ result Winning business sector 
Recombinant plants Complete Victory Agro-business 
Recombinant pharmaceuticals Unavoidable Loss Pharmaceutical business 
Table 1. Fate of major businesses in the new born market of recombinant bio-products 
Meanwhile, the chemical industry, once seen as the leader in commercializing bio-products, 
has shown a general tendency of divestiture of bio-businesses, including the pharmaceutical 
business. Those new companies usually focus their resources in limited product areas. This 
results in cutthroat R&D competition in a small number of themes, naturally raising the 
share of R&D expenditure. This in turn necessitates pursuit of large sales by focusing on 
lucrative products, creating a vicious circle. Owing to such structural problems set forth in 
high tech innovation, all chemical firms have failed NPD not only in the bio-industry but 
also nanotech industry, which is demonstrated in the following sanction 2.2. 
2.2 Absolute win or unavoidable loss in nanotech industry businesses 
The fate of win or loss in nanotech products was the same. All firms in the nanotech-related 
industry have still now been establishing nanotech institute from 1990s. Nanotech boom 
started in 2000 and nanotech has prevailed over the material industry. Although nanotech 
broadly includes biotech, pure bio industrial area should be excluded from nanotech since 
bio started as recombinant technology earlier than nanotech in 1970s. Based on this 
definition, nanotech has been mainly applied to device and material. 
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Fig. 1. Moore’s law from Intel’s history (Intel HP) 
Exemplary examples in the nanotech device market are ICT devices like semiconductor, 
memory etc. The most famous law in this industry is "Moore's law" (Moore, 1965 and 1996). 
Moore's original statement was that transistor counts had doubled every year. As shown in 
Figure 1, Intel has succeeded in continuous innovation by improving the performance of 
integrated circuit. Sustainable growth of ICT has been suspicious since small scaling limit is 
believed to reach in 2012. Intel is overcoming this limit by applying nanotech to integrated 
circuit. This clearly proves that major player could keep the position in the next market by 
continuous innovation. 
In case of nanotech material, the situation is completely opposite to the common prediction, as 
below. There is no noteworthy nanotech material market except carbon nano-materials like 
fullerene, carbon nanotube etc. A fullerene is any molecule composed entirely of carbon, in 
the form of a hollow sphere, ellipsoid, or tube as shown in Figure 2. Spherical fullerenes are 
also called buckyballs, and cylindrical ones are called carbon nanotubes or buckytubes. 
Buckyballs and buckytubes have been the subject of intense research, both for their unique 
chemistry and for their technological applications, especially in material science, electronics.  
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Fig. 2. Carbon nano-materials 
The existence of C60 was predicted by Eiji Osawa in a Japanese magazine in 1970 (Ozawa, 
1970). He noticed that the structure of a molecule was a subset of a soccer-ball shape, and he 
made the hypothesis that a full ball shape could also exist. His idea was merely reported in 
Japanese magazines. Also in 1970, R.W. Henson proposed the structure and made a model 
of C60 (Thrower, 1999). The evidence for this new form of carbon was very weak and was 
not accepted over 29-years period. 
From the viewpoint of the required expertise in the chemical profile of nanocarbon, the 
chemical industry, once seen as the leader in commercializing nanotech products, has 
shown a general tendency of divestiture of nanotech businesses, although the cosmetics and 
textile businesses succeeded in marketing nano-materials. Major companies usually focus 
their resources in limited product areas. This results in cutthroat R&D competition in a small 
number of themes, naturally raising the share of R&D expenditure. This in turn necessitates 
pursuit of large sales by focusing on lucrative products, creating a vicious circle. The entry 
has not been still now made not by chemical firms. Owing to such structural problems, 
unavoidable loss happened like bio-industry. Mitsubishi Corporation, the largest Japanese 
general trading company did break into the first market entry in 2003. Mitsubishi Chemical, 
a chemical company in Mitsubishi group denied its market but was urged to follow a small 
portion of investment. In spite of such common recognition in the chemical firms, 
Mitsubishi Co. assured to succeed in nanocarbon materials independently from any 
chemical businesses (hearing from Kojima, appointed President & CEO and then currently 
Chairman, and project team at Mitubishi Co., 2002). This situation is absolutely the same as 
in bio-tech industry. Chemical businesses denied the market potential of the new market, 
although they were expected to work as key players for high tech innovation. Only outsider 
could see the market potential. 
www.intechopen.com
 Products and Services; from R&D to Final Solutions 
 
20 
As summarized in Table 2, the fate of win or loss were opposite between device such as 
semiconductor and material like nano-carbon. IT device majors like Intel were successful in 
excluding newcomers from the semiconductor market, while no material businesses were 
able to commercialize nanocarbon materials except cosmetics and textile in spite of large-
scale R&D programs in dedicated laboratories. 
 
 Existing businesses' result Winning business sector 
Semiconductor Win IT business 
Carbon-nano material Unavoidable Loss General trading business 
Table 2. Fate of major businesses in the new born market of nanotech products 
2.3 Absolute win or unavoidable loss in ICT industry businesses 
Information and Communication Technology or ICT allow users to participate in a rapidly 
changing world in which work and other activities are increasingly transformed. ICT can be 
employed to give users quick access to ideas and experiences from a wide range of people, 
communities, cultures and political issues. In the recent decades widespread incorporation 
of ICT into many tiers of business and structuring of the global economy has occurred. ICT 
has increased international interconnectedness and sped up the process of globalization. In 
conjunction with globalization and the information revolution, ICT has reshaped the 
workforce and business system. By increasing the speed of international communication, 
ICT has enabled businesses to outsource jobs, both in the manufacturing as well as white 
collar sectors (Rice, 2005).  
In accordance with diversification of communication method, this trend, ICT accelerates the 
business model from mortal to click. By structuring network among everything, ICT 
increases the accessibility to the necessary information and decrease of the transaction cost. 
This feature brought forth new economical role as intermediate. Critical changes by ICT 
owed to the increase of utility of information and therefore caused in changes of transaction 
systems.  
Opposite to the semiconductor business, existing businesses such as securities, retailing, 
advertisement, music did not take initiative for the transaction business system by using 
ICT, as shown in Table 3. Beyond the common expectation, all the new business systems are 
taken over not by outsider but also by new comers. This is the typical feature of ICT 
business, which is not observed in other high tech field. 
 
 Existing businesses’ result Winning business sector 
Securities Loss Internet security business 
Retailing Loss Internet shopping 
Advertisement Loss Net businesses 
Music Loss Download music 
Table 3. Fate of major businesses in the new born market by using ICT 
The case in the network music business was the same. The Network Music business is a 
rapidly emerging new market. Furthermore, the business approach has been changed 
frequently in response to rapid changes in customer preferences and the constant evolution 
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of technical platforms. Network Music systems are rapidly changing from one technology to 
another. In order to achieve optimal corporate profit, the most crucial factor should be “how 
to create strong customer relationships” through the network as a continuing source of 
network music business. Key success factors in the network music business are now 
understood to be the capability to continuously create new products based on the 
infrastructure of customer satisfaction in the network system. Before download music 
market, Walkman has prevailed across the world. Walkman was the strange tool because 
the use was limited only through earphone not by speaker. Download music player like 
iPod is much easier to store and select the music. Sony denied the market potential of 
download music at top management conference in 1999 (Idei, 2009). Furthermore, it is 
noteworthy that Japanese firms are most good at the technologies used in iPod. This proved 
that technological top tier is not sufficient for win the new market, in other words, not 
useful for successful launch of innovative product. 
2.4 Structural problems of high tech industry management 
These situations raise a question whether the typically research-intensive high tech 
industries like bio, nanotech and ICT, with by far the largest or larger R&D expenditure in 
the whole industrial sector, have succeeded in innovation through high tech. In case of 
pharmaceutical firms, while publicizing themselves as the leaders in bioengineering for 
healthcare, existing companies in this field are losing the new market to newcomers, and 
trying to counter by expansion through M&A, resulting in yearly changing sales ranking. 
Smaller enterprises are forced to focus on a limited product lines. This may bring about 
higher efficiency and profit for a short period, but its long-term effectiveness is questionable. 
The present work discusses the management of high tech businesses to show that 
circumstances exist: 
1. where major businesses succeed in product innovation allowing no newcomers to 
participate in the new market  
2. where they fail because of the "revenge of past success"; 
3. factors exist that decide the win or loss. 
4. by elucidating the mechanism of the win and loss, it is demonstrated that the product 
development in the high tech business requires a management strategy different from 
that for other industry branches. 
3. Win or loss in the development of high tech products and business 
3.1 Win or loss in the launch of high tech products 
The performance of major businesses in the development of new biotechnology-related 
products is shown in Table 4. All the majors in the agricultural products have successfully 
commercialized bio-products such as recombinant crops and remain as market leaders. The 
food majors have also succeeded in assimilating biotechnology for renovation of production 
processes and development of new products. In contrast, the pharmaceutical and chemical 
majors were unsuccessful in antibody formulations and other biologics, except for products 
earlier developed such as insulin or growth hormones in spite of almost frenzied effort, 
including establishment of new laboratories dedicated to bioscience. Chemical companies 
have also lost the potential market of nanotech products even after the winners from other 
fields. Situations were similar in a related area: leading manufacturers of syringed did not 
develop needle-free syringes used in administration of biologics. 
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Antibody pharmaceuticals Loss 
Nanotech materials Loss 
Needle-free syringes Loss 
Table 4. Performance of major businesses in new markets by high tech products 
Win in biotech products development seems to depend on several factors. Table 5 sets win 
case to loss case for clarifying market position of majors to high tech products. Situations of 
agricultural products and biopharmaceuticals described earlier may be analyzed in terms of 
a few aspects. 
 
 Agricultural majors Pharmaceuticals majors 
Business result Win Loss 
Competition Direct Indirect/neutral 
New products Replace existing products Create new markets 
New product development Promoted Neglected 
Table 5. Position of majors to high tech upcoming products 
New agricultural products, such as recombinant crops, are in direct competition with 
existing products and will replace them as far as the advantage of the new products are 
maintained. This prompts the market leaders to keep their position by developing new 
products instead of insisting on their existing product lines. They can exploit wealth of 
relevant information for their competitive advantage, leaving little hope of market entry for 
potential newcomers. In fact, examples of successful entry by newcomers are limited to 
those in niche markets neglected by the majors. 
Reverse is the case for bio-pharmaceuticals and antibody pharmaceuticals. Leading 
manufacturers of first-generation bio-products such as insulin, growth hormones started the 
development and launch in the market once the technology has been confirmed. As the facts 
described, they have immediately followed the emerging high tech itself and furthermore 
master the production and marketing of the bio-pharmaceuticals. In spite of core 
capabilities, all of majors failed in development of granulocytic proliferation factor, or the 
multibillion-dollar erythropoietin, antibody pharmaceuticals, which compete only indirectly 
with existing products or are neutral to competition, and create their own new markets as 
shown in Table 6. The majors neglected products development because they failed to 
recognize the potentially huge market size for those products (which they predicted, 
instead, would form only small niche markets). In other words, the majors were not willing 
to be competitors in the new field, thus allowing newcomers to dominate the market easily. 
This miscalculation was also responsible for their failure to respond to the need for 
marketing partners of the newcomers without established sales network, which would have 
meant an opportunity to seize on the new market without compromising the existing 
products. This is a typical case of the "revenge of success" (Takayama, 2002; Takayama & 
Watanabe 2002). Amgen, a pioneer of bio-pharmaceuticals, benefited from these 
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circumstances so much so that its top management provided a president of Pharmaceutical 







Business result Win Loss 
Competition Direct Indirect/neutral 
New products Replace existing products Create new markets 
New product development Promoted Neglected 
Table 6. Position of existing majors to first-generation bio-pharmaceuticals and new born 
bio-pharmaceuticals 
3.2 Win or loss in starting new business system by using high tech 
As a proof of the difficulties of the entry to business system by existing players, cloud 
computing exhibits many examples. Cloud computing had been recognized as next wave 
for technology investors (Hamilton, 2008). As Cloud platforms become ubiquitous, global 
cloud is expected to serve as an exchange and market infrastructure for trading services, 
since the need for internetworking create a market oriented global cloud exchange for 
trading services (Armbrust etc., 2009). SPI is KFS (Key Factors for Success) in cloud 
computing business; SaaS, PaaS and IaaS represent Software as a Service, Platform as a 
Service and Infrustructure as a Service., respectively. The sygnificant role of these core 
comcepts  can easily make out the conlusion that the most critical key success factor for the 
cloud business is public cloud. In spite of such common recognition for the market size, only 
small firms like OpSource started to provide the public cloud service, since all majors have 
hesitated to use cloud computing system due to immaturity of the system itself. 
4.  Mode of competition as a decisive factor 
Examples described above clearly shows that the mode of competition between new and old 
products is a decisive factor for corporate behavior with respect to new products. Direct or 
indirect competition of a new product with a company's existing products determines 
whether the company wins or loses in launch of that particular product or start of noble 
business system. Since the mode of competition of a new product depends on the nature of 
existing products, different companies may behave in different ways even in one and the 
same market segment. 
4.1 Case of specified supplementary foods 
Another example of such corporate behavior can be found in the rapidly growing market in 
Japan of "specified supplementary foods", a class of foods which contain specific therapeutic 
ingredients and are approved by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare based on test 
results on the safety and effectiveness. A major area of such foods is life style related 
diseases as represented by metabolic diseases including diabetes mellitus, hyperlipemia, 
hypertension and hyperlithemia, which are the main targeted therapeutic area of all 
pharmaceutical businesses. Many supplementary foods against these diseases have been 
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developed by both big and small businesses, creating a market of about a trillion yen. It is 
predicted that "the market will more than double if the national health insurance system is 
modified to allow doctors to prescribe supplementary foods for prevention of adult 
diseases, particularly against fatigue and enhancing functions of blood vessel endothelium 
cells" (Nikkei Health, Jan. 28, 2005). For this purpose, the insurance system has begun to 
change from 2009. This is a considerable market size compared with 8,850 billion yen sales 
for all Japanese pharmaceuticals prescribed by physicians (mix, 2010) and 774 billion yen for 
OTC sold at drugstore (Yano Research Institute, 2009) in 2009. 
Drug manufacturers are in the most advantageous position in this market sector with the 
expertise in new drug evaluation, familiarity with the Ministry's policies, and existing health 
food divisions that eliminate prior investments for distribution channels, as well as 
accumulated drug-related knowledge, experience and infrastructure that possibly bring 
about synergistic effects. In short, this market should be the easiest for drug manufacturers 
to attack. Actually, however, companies behaved as shown in Table 7. Drug manufacturers, 
including smaller ones, did not attempt product development, not to mention market entry. 
Food or drink majors behaved the same as drug majors. This is clearly not their failure but 
their intention. The new market was rapidly created in 2003 by catechin green tea drink of 
Kao, which was originally a soap company and currently a commodity major in the 
Japanese market. Only inexperienced firm has succeeded in entry to new born market. 
Similar phenomena have been observed in the American and European functional food 
markets. As recent topis, iPod by Apple was the same case, although the first winner in the 
former market failed to enter rather denied the market, as described in Section 2.3. 
 
 
Food or drink 
majors 
Drug majors Kao, outsider 
Market entry Loss Loss Win 
Mode of competition Indirect Indirect Inexperienced 
New products Create new market Create new market Create new market 
Product development Hampered Hampered Promoted 
Table 7. Corporate behavior in supplementary food market 
The catechin was well-known as bitter ingredient of green tea and lipid-lowering function 
for human body. As the most popular green tea drink major, Itoen Inc. discovered canned 
green tea in 1985 (Itoen HP) and had kept the top market share, around 40% for 20 years 
(Ishii, 2010). Drink major firms including Itouen, Suntory etc. know the mode of function of 
catechin for lowing lipid, they neglected as a transient boom even after Kao sold 20 billion 
yen after 10 months from the launch. More interestingly, all drug majors neglected the 
market itself notwithstanding exactly the same targeted as drugs. It is worthy of remark that 
winner has not held any value chain such as food or health-care channel in addition to lack 
of any authorized core competence for the new market. 
The cases presented so far are concerned with new products that create new markets. But 
the same analysis can also be made for new products within existing market sectors. The 
same pattern of win and loss of the majors is observed in every country (Takayama, 2002; 
Takayama & Watanabe, 2002; Takayama, Watanabe & Griffy-Brown, 2002; Takayama, 
Takayama, 2005; Takayama 2009). Some cases are described in the following sections. 
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4.2 Case of the most competitive new product in the most competitive market 
A typical example of such cases is the antihypertensive drugs, which accounts for about 10% 
of the world drug market from 1990s and now forecasted to increase the share in the market. 
Hypertension is a kind of lifestyle-related diseases, although few symptoms, heart failure, 
cerebral hemorrhage, myocardial infarction and other dangerous complications are caused.  
The anti-hypertensive market is almost mature in the early 2000s, because the existing 
products treat almost 90% of patients. According to interviews conducted by the authors, 
only three companies in the top 20 pharmaceut ical companies in the world maintained 
research activity for hypertensive drugs in 1999 and the others have been winding down 
this activity, although all companies reinforced research activity on anti-hypertensive drugs 
at least 10 years ago. Last product innovation was emergent, although the anti-hypertensive 
market is in the mature stage. The final products, angiotensin receptor blocker (ARB; ATII: 
angiotensin II receptor antagonist) were made based on the same new technology and have 
been launched country by country. In Japan, the first product was launched in August 1998. 
In hypertensive medication, there are two major products, Ca blocker (Ca) and Angiotensine 
Converting Enzyme Inhibitor (ACE). Since Ca shows rapid onset and sharp efficacy, it is 
used as the first choice for the treatment of hypertensive patients who do not have organ 
malfunction, such as diabetics. Although the efficacy of ACE is less than Ca and ACE has 
the side effect of a cough, ACE is used for older patients who are at risk from organ damage. 
As the final new product in this market, the first product of ARB has launched by Merck Co. 
in 1995 and its peak sales was, at that time, estimated around 400 million dollars in the 
world. After 10 years of the first launch, this new product category has replaced Ca 
antagonist, the largest product category in the existing hypertensive market (Fuji Keizai, 
2010). In 2004, sales of ARB in the Japanese pharmaceuticals market has exceeded 
hyperlipidemia market, which was the largest product category and also the main target of 
specified supplementary food as described in section 4.1. 
After the severe competition of new drug development from 1990s to the early 2000s, have 
proved to dominate the world antihypertensive market with a share over 70% for the first 
prescribed patients. In the struggle for this huge market involving drug manufacturers of all 
sizes, the majors which had product lines not in direct rivalry with ARBs, e.g. calcium 
antagonists, were eventual losers: they did not succeed in development, if any, of the new 
product, at least in a timely manner. The "calcium myth", promoted in Japan by the leaders of 
the antihypertensives market, which claimed the superiority of Ca antagonists, did not play 
any important role in the process. Rather, the majors fell victim to the revenge of their own 
success in every country (Takayama, 2002; Takayama & Watanabe, 2002). The performance of 
specific enterprises is summarized in Table 8 by the top 10 companies in the world Ca market. 
Of the top 10 companies, nine have no ARB product and two firms with minor share did get 
the co-marketing right of ARB from other marketing partners. Although two companies, 
Takeda and Novartis, have ARB pro ducts, Takeda does not market Ca outside of Japan, and 
Sandoz Co. and Ciba-Geigy Co. (who are merged and became Novartis) brought ARB in 1997. 
Two companies, Hoechst and Astra, are developing license-in ATII products. Ten out of the 
top 10 companies have no self-made or self-developed products in the world market, although 
those products became the global mega breakthrough products in the middle of 2000s. 
In contrast, most of the major producers of ACE inhibitors which are indirect competition 
with ARBs succeeded in product development (see Table 9) (Takayama, 2002; Takayama & 
Watanabe 2002). They were able to exploit their superiority in information access for more 
speedy development, which prevented effectively newcomers from entering the market. 
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The behavior of ACE leaders is different as demonstrated in Table 9. The positive behavior of 
leading companies4 for developing ARB or ACE/NEP. ACE/NEP is expected to be a superior 
product to ACE, like ARB, because it has higher potency than ACE and reduces the cough side 
effect of ACE by adding NEP inhibitor activity. Seven out of the top 10 companies are 
developing their own products and one company is developing a license-in product. This fact 
demonstrates the positive attitude of the ACE leader1 for developing ARB. The remaining two 
companies do not develop ARB. This is because of their strong position as first and second in 
the Ca market, since their total market share is approximately 47%. 
 
Company Market share (%) Development priority 
Pfizer 33.9 -- 
Bayer 12.8 -- 
Hoechst 9.0 Third (licensed) 
Astra 3.7 Fifth (licensed from Takeda) 
BASF 2.7 -- 
Monsanto (Searle) 2.4 -- 
Kyowa Hakko 2.2 -- 
Yamanouchi 2.0 -- 
Takeda 2.0 Ninth (licensor) 
Ciba-Geigy 2.0  
Source: World Review 1999 by IMS Health (The Pharmaceutical Market) 





Market share (%) 
Development priority 
Merck Co. 31.0 First 
Zeneca 13.4 Fifth (licensed from Tanabe) 
Bristol-Meyers Squibb 10.7 
Fourth (First as ACE/NEP 
inhibitors) 
Warner-Lambert 6.4 -- 
Novartis 5.3 Second 
Hoechst 3.8 Third 
Servier 3.7 Second as ACE/NEP inhibitors 
Tanabe 1.9 -- 
Banyu 1.8 First 
Sankyo 1.7 
Eighth (licensor to European 
companies) 
Source: World Review 1999 by IMS Health (The Pharmaceutical Market) 
Table 9. "Revenge of success" to market leaders of ACEs, a product competing with ARBs 
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ARB is superior to ACE and differentiated from Ca. From a market viewpoint, ARB 
competes with ACE directly and replaces the ACE market. The leaders in the ACE market 
need to develop ARB to keep the current market position because it is obvious that ACE will 
be replaced once AEB is marketed. In contrast, Ca does not compete with ARB but creates a 
new market. The leaders in the Ca market do not need to develop ARB to keep their market 
position in the Ca market, as described above. Surprisingly, the leaders in the Ca market, 
including Japanese companies, were prohibited from the development of ARB.  
 
Positioning of new product Superior Differentiated 
Competition with existing 
product 
Direct competing with 
ACE 
Indirect competition or neutral 
with Ca 
Mode of market penetration Replace old product Create new market 
Attitude to NPD Enhancing Inhibitory 
Table 10. Two types of new product 
This finding demonstrates that a strong existing product inhibits NPD when the product 
creates a new market, as summarized in Table 10. The most critical reason for the failure of 
NPD of ARB was the underestimation of the sales forecast, since the sales forecast is 
basically calculated based on product strength. The company acts to increase the strength of 
its own product as a market winner in Ca, insisting on the strength of its own product 
(Monthly Mix, April 1999). This reduces the market value of the new product, creating a 
new market. 
4.3 Case of innovative medical device in the old market 
New and innovative medical device technology continues to emerge every year from 
companies worldwide. Some of these new technologies offer vastly superior capabilities 
than existing technology, however acceptance of many of these new innovative and superior 
medical device products often encounter tremendous resistance and neglect by major 
market players in the marketplace, even when using the outside opinions for evaluation of 
the product introduction. There appear to be a neglect of emerging market. This section 
provides the results of a case study of needle-free injection technology from which many 
valuable findings were derived. 
Firms competing in increasingly sophisticated technology markets have encountered a new 
set of challenges. Responding to customer needs is crucial for survival, while for society as a 
whole, there are requirements for expanding the reach of technological benefits to larger 
numbers of individuals. At the firm level, maximizing customer satisfaction by providing an 
efficient internal manufacturing system and simultaneously securing flexibility 
corresponding to dynamic and rapid change have become important aspects of any 
competitive survival strategy. As an inevitable result of too much strengthening of a specific 
core field, one failure often observed is an inability to quickly move into complementary or 
different product areas. One survival solution is co-evolution of technology products 
developed in such a way that external and internal firm circumstances affecting the 
customer are constantly considered. The question this analysis addresses is, “How do we 
construct an interface between core and new products in order to simultaneously maximize 
core competence and yet at the same time remain flexible?”  
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Institutional elasticity is one mechanism for creating such a trade-off between stability and 
ongoing new product development. Intriguing in-depth recent case studies on Sears 
Roebuck, Monsanto, Royal Dutch Shell, the US Army, British Petroleum, Hewlett Packard 
and Sun Microsystems (Pascale et al., 2000), demonstrate that in business, as in nature, there 
are no permanent winners. There are just firms that either react to change and evolve, or 
those that get left behind and become extinct. Equilibrium is a very dangerous position for 
survival, and innovation usually takes place on the edge of chaos. Self-organization and 
emergence occur naturally. Organizations are generally more turbulent than directed. 
Monsanto has successfully remained on the edge of the new business front managing the 
trade-offs in technology co-evolution. Monsanto is well-known that the company has 
leading core competence for bio-technology outstandingly different from other biotech 
firms. Aspartame, artificial sweetner is one of famous product that is produced by comining 
biotech and chemical technology. Inspite of the former success in food and agricultural 
NPDs, it could not move beyond its core products. Owing to the failure of NPD in the 
biotech market, pharmaceutical division of Monsanto is  merged by Pharmacia Upjohn in 
2000 due to a systemic disconnect between management, technology and market signals. 






Spring powered medical device – Drug Delivery
Disposable sterile medication cartridge (Ampule)
 
Fig. 3. Construction of needle-free injector device (Inject Co.  www.injex.com) 
Needle-free drug injection technology is a classic example that reveals the existence of 
disconnect between technology and market signals, since it is not a new idea. The early and 
crude beginning of this technology started over 50 years ago, and was later used by the U.S. 
military to vaccinate military troops in the 1960’s. During the 1970’s and 1980’s others began 
to conduct extensive R&D to improve, modify and make the technology much more 
consistent, reliable, pain free and with simple to use ergonomic designs. Today these needle-
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free injectors are very small pen-like and very ergonomically designed high tech 
instruments as shown in Figure 3 and 4. 
In this section, INJEX–Equidyne Systems, Inc. is selected since it is considered one of the top 
two leading companies in the needle-free drug delivery industry and once selected as a 
partner by a Japanese largest pharmaceutical company and Pharmacia Upjohn before 
merger with Pfizer (personal communication with those firms). The company is more than 
fifteen years in business and manufactures and distributes product in over 40 countries 
worldwide. The company was awarded in 2004 the “medical device technology company of 
the year” by the well known Frost & Sullivan technology research firm for outstanding and 
innovative technology as well as excellence in product quality for this industry.  
 










Fig. 4. Mechanism of needle-free syringe for injection through skin (Inject Co. 
www.injex.com) 
After investigation of the issues as well as looking at consumer needs and overall market 
demand, social issues and other factors, we were able to develop some relevant findings, 
valuable information and interesting conclusions.  
The major pharmaceutical and needle syringe manufacturers have generally overlooked 
needle-free drug delivery technology. In fact, insulin is injected with tiny-needle syringe by 
patients themselves every day. Although they claim that they are continuously looking for 
new and innovative technologies which they can adapt to their current business needs for 
drug delivery for waccine or pandemic disease like influenza, they have somehow not been 
able to see the opportunity that needle-free drug injection presents. In this case, each player 
in the market behave differently since their position to the new product differs each other, as 
described below in Table 11.  
With regard to syringe majors and drug majors, competence is tied to technological core 
competence, this system works as a strong support for enforcing the original core field of 
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individual firms. Therefore, it potentially creates inertia which keeps a firm from moving 
beyond its past. This rigid structure is a cause of “Revenge of Success” for major market 
players (Takayama, 2002; Takayama & Watanabe, 2002; Takayama, Watanabe & Griffy-
Brown, 2002ab; Takayama, 2004). This owes to a rigid scheme adhered to by product 
evaluation system as internal routine that is related to extensive knowledge of major market 
players.  In case of the injector device majors including the first and second-tiered Japanese 
majors and the largest major in the world have evaluated this needle-free injector for about 
one year, conclusively, they decided not to enter the needle-free syringe market. The reason 
was very simple that syringe business will continue without infringement of evasion of 
needle-free syringe (interview to those firms). 
 
 Syringe Majors Drug majors End User (Patients) 
Positioning of new 
product 









Mode of market 
penetration 
Niche or littel market Create new market Replace 
Attitude to NPD Neglect Hesitate Promote 
Table 11. Two types of new products 
The scheme of the evaluation routine, which is connected to an open network including 
outsiders, plays two different roles, depending product positioning of emerging technology 
in the existing market. (Takayama, Fukushima & Petersen, 2005) 
1. In the case of replacing or enhancing an existing product, the open network accelerates 
the incorporation of new product.  
2. On the contrary, when creating a new product market, the open network serves to 
accelerate the early abandonment of poor in-house NPD and also helps to enhance the 
rejection of outside strategic alliance.  
This practice tends to ensure over-evaluation of a potential new core product evaluation, by 
the major player in the industry. The open network inevitably brings to any major market 
player in a high tech market, superior insight and wisdom to analyze and effectively select 
the correct path for a major success with a new product introduction. This fate is set forth by 
a cardinal strategy set forth by the major market players, which allows them to compete for 
top-tier (Takayama, 2004). In conclusion, the fate to win or lose by the market major players 
is intrinsically highly influenced by “Revenge of Success” though the use of the “Inertia on 
the open network”. In summary, this clearly indicates that open innovation does not work if 
the market is emerging or newly born from naught. 
4.4 Win or loss in the new born market 
Following the afore-mentioned discussion, Table 12 and Table 13 summarize mode of 
competition in some win cases and loss cases of existing majors in the new born markets 
that are caused by high tech innovation, respectively. 
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In summary, win cases of existing major in the new born markets are expained by direct 
competition in the new born market. On the contrary, loss cases of existing major in the new 
born markets are characterized by indirect or neutral competition of new product to the 
existing product. 
 
 Existing majors Mode of competition 
Cassette tape recorder Record player Direct 
CD player Cassette tape recorder Direct 
Digital camera Camera film Direct 
DVD VHS manufacturors Direct 
Table 12. Win cases of existing majors in the new born markets 
 
 Existing majors Mode of competition 
Electrics Lamp, Mill Indirect or neutral 
Automobile Carriage Indirect or neutral 
Cassette tape Viny record Indirect or neutral 
PC Computor Indirect or neutral 
Amazon Book store Indirect or neutral 
Net secrities Secrities Indirect or neutral 
Net  retailing Department store Indirect or neutral 
Net news Newspaper, TV Indirect or neutral 
Table 13. Loss cases of existing majors in the new born markets 
5.  Success/failure matrix and replacement of the majors 
The importance of the mode of competition of a new product with existing products, 
regardless if the two are in the same market sector, has so far been amply illustrated so far.  
The practically deterministic situation may be summarized in a matrix shown in Table 14. 
An enterprise (major or otherwise) will make serious efforts in developing a new product 
that may compromise existing core products.  In this case, leading companies with a wealth 
of experience and information associated with those core products are in a highly 
advantageous position, so that chances for inexperienced newcomers are scarce. 
 
 Direct competition Indirect competition 
Majors Win Loss 
Newcomers Loss Win 
Table 14. Win/loss matrix 
In contrast, the majors will do nothing if the new product does not compete with their 
existing products: they lose the opportunity because they are unaware of the market 
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potential. This mechanism will lead to replacement of the majors if the new product creates 
its own new market, because it is dominated by newcomers and the majors that would be 
most familiar with the market are excluded. 
 
 Majors Newcomers 
Regenerative therapy Pharmaceutical Fermentation, venture businesses 
Gene therapy Pharmaceutical Venture businesses 
Nano-biotechnology Pharmaceutical, mechanical Trading, venture businesses 
Table 15. Replacement of the majors in a new market 
In case of regenerative medicine, gene therapy and nano-biotech are not regarded as direct 
competitors to pharmaceuticals.  Regeneration of the skin or neurons and regenerative 
therapy of heat failure are being developed by non-pharmaceutical companies as shown in 
Table 15. Although these techniques, as well as gene therapy and nano-biotech, will partly 
replace pharmaceutics in future, drug manufacturers are blind to their market potential. In 
the near future, pharmacuticals businesses, that insit themselves as representatives of life 
science business (Pisano, 2006), will lose the future huge market and new born market will 
be taken over by new comers. 
6.  Mechanism of success and failure 
The mechanism that determines win or loss of a new product development by promoting or 
hampering corporate R&D works as if by God's hand, as illustrated by the examples 
presented above. In the highly R&D-intensive bioindustry, market leaders tend to 
concentrate on their core area, as typified by drug manufacturers. The result is competition 
for the top tier in a homogeneous environment, which becomes inevitably a rat race 
(Takayama, 2004). Winners in a market are driven by the "inertia of success", or a desire to 
continue to succeed, resulting in failure of recognizing the potential of new products outside 
their own markets (Takayama, Watanabe and Griffy-Brown, 2002a). Management of 
biobusinesses should take this tendency into account, which has not, however, been well 
recognized. 
Table 16 compares some philosophical aspects of the conventional industries and 
bioindusty. The former deals with visible physical entities using a common language. 
Therefore, a competitor's logic is understandable, and individual companies compete with 
each other in a homogeneous situation. In contrast, the biological world is not entirely 
logical. Lack of a common language prevents entrepreneurs in this unforeseeable world  
 
 Conventional industries Bioindustry 
Logic Physical Biological 
Visibility Visible Invisible 
Predictability Logical Ambiguous 
Language Shared Individual 
Competition Homogeneous Heterogeneous 
Table 16. Philosophical aspects of the conventional industries and bioindusty 
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from knowing competitors' intentions clearly. Their competition, therefore, tends to occur in 
a heterogeneous environment. This is reflected in the fact that none of the multifarious 
biotech products has become a staple commodity. 
These differences have not been well recognized.  From the viewpoint of conventional 
industries, the biobusiness is full of tedious processes that are needed before knowing how 
to manage the unpredictable R&D processes and capricious markets.  This accounts largely 
for the failure of chemical and drug majors in new biotech products. 
Corporate goals is in general recognized to be based on the interests of each firm for type of 
product, social issues, customer preferences and demographics. The general consensus is 
that improvement of the product acceptance and success is mainly attributed to the 
company’s keen understanding and a strong sense of the customer needs and general 
market. Surprisingly, the conclusion is exactly the opposite of the general assumptions. 
Those firms that have a strong interest primarily in product development have failed to 
keep market share. These firms successfully develop new products on the technology 
platform. On the contrary to such strong attention to product development R&D and their 
technology, they may only catch up with the fast movement when a new market was 
created by other players in the different market. 
7. Conclusion 
In order to create a firm position in the new born market, strong customer relations seems to 
be most important influential factor to catch up with the market needs and more customer’s 
satisfaction. Opposition to this general hypothesis, major theories are supported by those 
that believe that innovative product has been successfully developed by firms who have 
keen interest in society and human relations including employee relations.  
Although these attention definitely seems to contribute to maintain core competency of the 
firm, most companies prefer to take the easy way to develop new product by connecting to 
customers and market. Afore-mentioned facts demonstrate that a strong interest in product 
or corporate profit cannot maintain core competence for product development especially in 
the case where a new market is created.  
What is core competence for creating new market? The strongest core is recognized that 
human relations and employee relations in the business. The conclusion in this article is 
that the major firm has a unavoidable fate to deny any new born markers that is 
differentiated and hence indirectly competed with existing major’s products. The law of 
success or failure of innovation is applicable to not only all high tech driven industry such 
as the biotech, nanotech, and ICT industry but also new born market that is created by 
continuous innovation such as new hypertensive pharmaceuticals, specified 
supplementary foods, down-load music etc. This owes to the neglect of a crucial message 
from the customers in the new born market like needle-free syringe or regeneration 
therapy. In spite of major’s strong competitive capabilities, the success or loss of each of 
major players in the new born market is decided by invisible hand of God. How to evade 
from the fate is the most important implication at the end of this Chapter.  All businesses, 
though, cannot evade from the fate of the law of success or failure. This owes to the 
neglect of a crucial message from the customers in the new born market like needle-free 
syringe or regeneration therapy. 
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